By George Friedman
For the past year, Stratfor has been focusing on what we see as the critical
global geopolitical picture. As the U.S.-jihadist war has developed, it has
absorbed American military resources dramatically. It is overstated to say that
the United States lacks the capacity to intervene anywhere else in the world,
but it is not overstated to say that the United States cannot make a major,
sustained intervention without abandoning Iraq. Thus, the only global power has placed
almost all of its military chips in the Islamic world.
Exploiting U.S. Distractions
Russia has taken advantage of the imbalance in the U.S. politico-military
posture to attempt to re-establish its sphere
of influence in the former Soviet Union. To this end, Russia has
taken advantage of its enhanced financial position — due to soaring commodity
prices, particularly in the energy sector — as well as a lack of American
options in the region.
The Russians do not have any interest in re-establishing the Soviet Union,
nor even in controlling the internal affairs of most of the former Soviet
republics. Moscow does want to do two things, however. First, it wants to
coordinate commodity policies across the board to enhance Russian leverage.
Second, and far more important, it wants to limit U.S. and European influence in
these countries. Above all, Russia does not want to see NATO expand any further
— and Moscow undoubtedly would like to see a NATO rollback, particularly in the
Baltic states.
From a strategic point of view, the United States emerged from the Cold War
with a major opportunity. Since it is not in the United States’ interests to
have any great power emerge in Eurasia, making certain that Russia did not
re-emerge as a Eurasian hegemon clearly was a strategic goal of the United
States. The Soviet disintegration did not in any way guarantee that it would not
re-emerge in another form.
The United States pursued this goal in two ways. The first was by seeking to
influence the nature of the Russian regime, trying to make it democratic and
capitalist under the theory that democratic and capitalist nations did not
engage in conflict with democratic and capitalist countries. Whatever the value
of the theory, what emerged was not democracy and capitalism but systemic chaos
and decomposition. The Russians ultimately achieved this state on their own,
though the United States and Europe certainly contributed.
The second way Washington pursued this goal was by trying to repeat the
containment of the Soviet Union with a new containment of Russia. Under this
strategy, the United States in particular executed a series of moves with the
end of expanding U.S. influence in the countries surrounding Russia. This
strategy’s capstone was incorporating new countries into NATO, or putting them
on the path to NATO membership.
NATO Expansion and Color Revolutions
The Baltic states were included, along with the former Soviet empire in
Central Europe. But the critical piece in all of this was Ukraine. If Ukraine
were included in NATO or fell under Western influence, Russia’s southern flank
would become indefensible. NATO would be a hundred miles from Volgograd,
formerly known as Stalingrad. NATO would also be less than a hundred miles from
St. Petersburg. In short, Russia would become a strategic cripple.
The U.S. strategy was to encourage pro-American, democratic
movements in the former Soviet Republics — the so-called “color
revolutions.” The Orange Revolution in Ukraine was the breaking point in
U.S.-Russian relations. The United States openly supported the pro-Western
democrats in Ukraine. The Russians (correctly) saw this as a direct and
deliberate challenge by the United States to Russian national security. In their
view, the United States was using the generation of democratic movements in
Ukraine to draw Ukraine into the Western orbit and ultimately into NATO.
Having their own means of influence in Ukraine, the Russians intervened
politically to put a brake on the evolution. The result was a stalemate that
Russia appeared destined to win by dint of U.S. preoccupation with the Islamic
world, Russian proximity, and the fact that Russia had an overwhelming interest
in Ukraine while the Americans had only a distant interest.
U.S. interest might have been greater than the Russians thought. The
Americans have watched the re-emergence of Russia as a major regional power. It
is no global superpower, but it certainly has regained its position as a
regional power, reaching outside of its own region in the Middle East and
elsewhere. The Iranians and Germans must both take Russia into account as they
make their calculations. The Russian trajectory is thus clear. They may never be
a global power again, but they are going to be a power that matters.
The Closing Window
It is far easier for the United States to prevent the emergence of a regional
hegemon than to control one that has already emerged. Logically, the United
States wants to block the Russian re-emergence, but Washington is running out of
time. Indeed, one might say that the Americans are already out of time.
Certainly, the United States must act now or else accept Russia as a great power
and treat it as such.
This is why U.S. President George W. Bush has gone to Ukraine. It is
important to recall that Bush’s trip comes in the context of an upcoming NATO
summit, where the United States has called for beginning the process that will
include Ukraine — as well as Georgia and other Balkan powers — in
NATO. Having gone relatively quiet on the issue of NATO expansion
since the Orange Revolution, the United States now has become extremely
aggressive. In traveling to Ukraine to tout NATO membership, Bush is directly
challenging the Russians on what they regard as their home turf.
Clearly, the U.S. window of opportunity is closing: Russian economic,
political and military influence in Ukraine is substantial and growing, while
the U.S. ability to manipulate events in Ukraine is weak. But Bush is taking a
risky step. First, Bush doesn’t have full NATO support, which he needs since
NATO requires unanimity in these issues. Several
important NATO countries —particularly Germany — have opposed this
expansion on technical merits that are hard to argue with. Germany’s stance is
that not only is Ukraine not militarily ready to start meaningful membership
talks, but that the majority of its population opposes membership in the first
place.
Assuming Bush isn’t simply making an empty gesture for the mere pleasure of
irritating the Russians, the United States clearly feels it can deal with German
objections if it creates the proper political atmosphere in Ukraine. Put another
way, Bush feels that if he can demonstrate that the Russians are impotent, that
their power is illusory, he can create consensus in NATO. Russia’s relatively
weak response over Kosovo has been taken by Washington and many in
Europe (particularly Central Europe) as a sign of Russian weakness. Bush wants
to push the advantage now, since he won’t have a chance later. So the visit has
been shaped as a direct challenge to Russia. Should Moscow fail to take up the
challenge, the dynamics of the former Soviet Union will be changed.
The Russians have three possible countermoves. The first is to use the
Federal Security Service (FSB), its intelligence service, to destabilize
Ukraine. Russia has many assets in Ukraine, and Russia is good at this game.
Second, Russia can use its regional military power to demonstrate that the
United States is the one bluffing. And third, Russia can return the favor to the
Americans in a place that will hurt very badly; namely, in the Middle East — and
particularly in Iran and Syria. A decision to engage in massive transfers of
weapons, particularly advanced anti-aircraft systems, would directly hurt the
United States.
Of these options, the first is certainly the most feasible. Not only is it
where the Russians excel — and will such a strategy leave few fingerprints and
produce results quickly — but the other two options risk consolidating the West
into a broad anti-Russian coalition that may well return the favor across the
entire Russian periphery. The latter two options would also commit much of
Russia’s resources to a confrontation with the West, leaving precious little to
hedge against other powers, most notably a China which is becoming more deeply
enmeshed in Central Asia by the day.
The Middle East Connection
Still, the United States must focus on where most of its troops are fighting.
It would thus appear that provoking the Russians is a dangerous game. This is
why events in Iraq this week have been particularly interesting. A massive
battle broke out between two Shiite factions in Iraq. One, led by Abdel Aziz
al-Hakim — who effectively
controls Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki due to the small size
and fractured nature of al-Maliki’s party — confronted the faction led by Muqtada
al-Sadr. Clearly, this was an attempt by the dominant Shiite faction
to finally deal with the wild card of Iraqi Shiite politics. By the weekend,
al-Sadr had capitulated. Backed into a corner by overwhelming forces, apparently
backed by U.S. military force, al-Sadr effectively sued for peace.
Al-Sadr’s decision to lay down arms was heavily influenced by the Iranians.
We would go further and say the decision to have al-Sadr submit to a government
dominated by his Shiite rivals was a decision made with Iranian agreement. The
Iranians had been restraining al-Sadr for a while, taking him to Tehran and
urging him to return to the seminary to establish his clerical credentials. The
Iranians did not want to see a civil war among the Iraqi Shia. A split
among the Shia at a time of increasing Sunni unity and cooperation
with the United States would open the door to a strategically unacceptable
outcome for Iran: a pro-American government heavily dominated by Sunnis with
increasing military power as the Shia are fighting among themselves.
The Americans also didn’t want this outcome. While the Iranians had
restrained al-Sadr at the beginning of the U.S. surge — and thereby massively
contributed to the end of the strategy of playing the Sunnis against the Shia —
Tehran had not yet dealt with al-Sadr decisively. Just like Iran, the United
States prefers not to see a new Sunni government emerge in Iraq. Instead,
Washington wants a balance of power in Baghdad between Sunnis, Shia and Kurds,
and it wants intra-communal disputes to be contained within this framework. If a
stable government is to emerge, each of the communities must be relatively (with
an emphasis on “relatively”) stable. Thus, not for the first time, American and
Iranian interests in Iraq were aligned. Both wanted an end to Shiite conflict,
and that meant that both wanted al-Sadr to capitulate.
This is the point where U.S. and Iranian interests can
diverge. The Iranians have a fundamental decision to make, and what
happens now in Iraq is almost completely contingent upon what the Iranians
decide. They can do three things. First, they can hold al-Sadr in reserve as a
threat to stability if things don’t go their way. Second, they can use the
relative unity of the Shia to try to impose an anti-Sunni government in Baghdad.
And third, they can participate in the creation of that government.
We have long argued that the Iranians would take the third option. They
certainly appeared to be cooperating in the last week. But it has not been clear
what the U.S. government thought, partly because they have been deliberately
opaque in their thinking on Iran, and partly because the situation was too
dynamic.
Bush’s Long Shot
It is the decision to visit Ukraine and challenge the Russians on their front
porch that gives us some sense of Washington’s thinking. To challenge Moscow at
a time when the Russians might be able to support Iran in causing a collapse in
the Iraqi process would not make sense. The U.S. challenge is a long shot
anyway, and risking a solution in Iraq by giving the Iranians a great power ally
like Russia would seem too much of a risk to take.
But Bush is going to Ukraine and is challenging the Russians on NATO. This
could mean he does not think Russia has any options in the Middle East. It also
could mean that he has become sufficiently confident that the process (let’s not
call it a relationship) that has emerged with the Iranians is robust enough that
Tehran will not sink it now in exchange for increased Russian support, and that
while a crisis with Syria is simmering, the Russians will not destabilize the
situation there — Syria lacks the importance that Iran holds for U.S. strategy
in Iraq, anyway.
Bush’s decision to go to Ukraine indicates that he feels safe in opening a
new front — at least diplomatically — while an existing military front remains
active. That move makes no sense, particularly in the face of some European
opposition, unless he believes the Russians are weaker than they appear and that
the American position in Iraq is resolving itself. Bush undoubtedly would have
liked to have waited for greater clarity in Iraq, but time is almost up. The
Russians are moving now, and the United States can either confront them now or
concede the game until the United States is in a military position to resume
Russian containment. Plus, Bush doesn’t have any years left in office to wait.
The global system is making a major shift now, as we have been discussing.
Having gotten off balance and bogged down in the Islamic world, the only global
power is trying to extricate itself while rebalancing its foreign policy and
confronting a longer-term Russian threat to its interests. That is a delicate
maneuver, and one that requires deftness and luck. As mentioned, it is also a
long shot. The Russians have a lot of cards to play, but perhaps they are not
yet ready to play them. Bush is risking Russia disrupting the Middle East as
well as increasing pressure in its own region. He either thinks it is worth the
risk or he thinks the risk is smaller than it appears. Either way, this is an
important moment.
